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Employees as
Corporate Stakeholders
Poonam Puri and Tuvia Borok
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Canada

Enron offers a prime case study to explore the many failures of the modern corporation to treat its employees even-handedly, ethically and with respect. Employees make
significant personal investments into the corporations they work for, but employee
interests are rarely of concern to directors.
This paper analyses several theories on the nature and purpose of the corporation
and argues that the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders ought to be
legally recognised in the corporation. The paper examines three theories on employees
and employment, and argues that the human capital theory is most meaningful and
best reflects the role of the employee when that employee is analysed in a broad
social, political and economic context.
The authors evaluate reforms, such as stakeholder statutes, which have been
implemented in various jurisdictions, and set out specific amendments that ought
to be implemented to recognise the status of the employee as an important corporate
stakeholder in the modern corporation.
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W

hose interests must be respected and honoured in the deliberation

of corporate actions? Which stakeholders have a legitimate claim on the corporation? Market changes and competitive pressures have forced companies to pursue
strategies such as mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, restructuring and downsizing.
However, these corporate tactics often fail and far too often result in bankruptcy.
The rise and fall of Enron is an unfortunate, but principal, example. Enron was formed
in a merger 15 years ago between two old-line natural gas pipeline companies. The
company did not conduct a traditional ‘bricks-and-mortar’ business. It sold itself as a
‘new-economy’ company. It developed sophisticated financial trading technologies and
made use of derivatives as a specialised financial instrument.
Enron’s corporate tactics ranked it as the seventh largest company in the USA in 2000,
with reported sales of US$1 billion. In fact, the press consistently presented the corporation as having the most extraordinary managers in the corporate market. Yet, despite its
successful and rapid growth, Enron also represented the largest bankruptcy in US
history. Several thousand employees lost their jobs immediately, and the remaining few
thousand have now also lost their jobs. The perceived splendour of Enron and its
management has dissipated. Approximately 20,000 employees lost most of their
retirement savings because the company had encouraged them to purchase Enron stock
for their 401(k) retirement plans. Employee claims in the bankruptcy rank behind many
other Enron creditors, and US$400 million remains owing to senior staff who will in
all probability recover only a fraction of their wages.
Enron’s actions for growth and success were driven by the desire for shareholder
wealth, as is the case with most large corporations. In fact, both corporate law statutes
(see e.g. Canadian Business Corporations Act 1985: s.122[1]) and case law in most
common law jurisdictions1 support the directors’ emphasis on shareholder interests.
This approach has served to benefit shareholders of publicly traded corporations but has
neglected to consider the inequities that arise for other stakeholder groups such as
creditors, customers, suppliers, local communities and, especially, employees.
Our focus in this paper is on employees. The legal status of employees under corporate law statutes in Canada and most other common law jurisdictions is shameful.
Employees are often not treated even-handedly, ethically or with respect because corporate decision-making focuses almost exclusively on shareholder value. Corporations that
engage in short-term thinking and cost-cutting measures to the detriment of employees
are ultimately hurting themselves. Employees are an important corporate stakeholder
group in the modern corporation. In this paper we make the case for employees as
primary corporate stakeholders whose interests ought to be considered by directors on
a par with shareholder interests. To this end, we propose a statutory provision that ought
to be included in corporate law statutes that expressly authorises directors to consider
employee interests together with shareholder interests.
Although in this paper we use Canadian and US corporate law for discussion, our
analysis and proposals for reform are worth consideration by other common law
jurisdictions that are similarly situated. An analysis and understanding of Canadian and
US corporate law on this issue is also important given the continued globalisation of
business and the elevated power and clout of North American organisations on the
global market. North American parent corporations are increasingly imposing their
corporate strategies and vision on subsidiaries and affiliates worldwide. Ultimately,
actions taken by North American corporations or laws that they must follow will create
a domino effect that will impact other foreign corporations and the conduct of business
internationally.
1 Courts have equated ‘acting in the best interests of the corporation’ with acting in the best interests

of the shareholders; see Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 170 N.W. 668 [1919].

50

JCC 8 Winter 2002

jcc8.puri

7/11/02

12:04 pm

Page 51

employees as corporate stakeholders

Following this introduction, we set out three competing theories on corporate governance and stakeholders: the traditional (shareholder primacy) theory, the progressive
(stakeholder) theory, and the human capital theory. We conclude that the human capital
theory is superior: that employees are investors of human capital with corporate
expectations equivalent to those of shareholders who are investors of financial capital.
We also advance the position that employees are more vulnerable than shareholders on
the basis that, unlike shareholders who may invest in multiple corporations, employees
are unable to diversify their investments as effectively. We also justify our focus on
employees and why we do not include other stakeholders in our analysis or proposals
for reform. In comparison with other stakeholder groups, such as customers and suppliers, employees are more permanently tied to their employer corporation and are not
as free to shift their relationships to other corporations. Customers and suppliers
generally have more choice to enter into transactions with a number of businesses. In
our view, the vulnerable and disadvantaged status of employees ranks them ahead of
other stakeholder groups and on a par with shareholders. We build on the human capital
theory to advance our argument in favour of requiring directors to consider employee
interests in corporate decision-making.
We then go on to analyse the legal status of employees under corporate law and make
the case that existing legal protection is insufficient. This is followed by an examination
of the success and criticism of US constituency statutes that allow directors to consider
non-shareholder interests in corporate decision-making. We analyse the critique that
constituency statutes make managers accountable to everyone in theory but no one in
practice. Accordingly, we cite US stakeholder statutes and build only on their strengths
in developing an employee-centred statutory provision. In the penultimate section we
introduce our model of an employee-focused stakeholder statute and explore the
implications of our solution. In the final section we present our conclusions.

Competing theories of corporate governance and stakeholders
How one conceptualises the term ‘corporation’ greatly affects the meaning of acting in
the ‘best interests of’ a corporation. In this section we analyse three competing theories
of corporate governance and consider the legitimacy of the interests of non-shareholder
stakeholders under each of them. We advance the position that the human capital theory
provides the best theoretical foundation on which the interests of employees ought to
be considered on a par with the interests of shareholders.

Traditional corporate law theory: shareholder primacy
Traditional corporate law theory is based on the view that shareholders are of primary
importance with respect to corporate decision-making. Under Canadian corporate law
statutes, directors owe a duty to act in the best interests of the corporation (CBCA 1985:
note 1, s.122[1][a]) interpreted by courts as a duty to maximise economic value for shareholders (see Dodge v. Ford Motor Company [1919]: note 1). In Parke v. Daily News [1962]:
Ch. 927), the court held that the directors breached their fiduciary duties when they
conferred a benefit on the company’s employees, to the financial detriment of its
shareholders (Parke v. Daily News [1962]: Ch. 963). The dicta of the case law is clear:
directors must maximise profits for the benefit of the shareholders, while the interests
of other stakeholder groups are to be protected through bargaining and contract law.
Four key premises underlie the reasoning justifying the shareholder primacy model
(Leblanc 1997):
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t Shareholders own the corporation.
t Other stakeholders can form contracts for their protection.
t Directors are agents of the corporation.
t A fiduciary duty is owed exclusively to shareholders.

On closer examination, these premises are flawed. On the first premise, it is too farreaching to assume that shareholders own the corporation. From an economical perspective, shareholders are the financial backbone of a corporation, but from a property
law outlook they have no ongoing legal ownership rights in the assets of a corporation.
Share ownership simply entitles shareholders to a bundle of rights that may include
voting and dividend rights, and rights on liquidation. Ownership of shares cannot stand
as a justification for a shareholder primacy model.
On the second premise, it is difficult to accept as a blanket statement that non-shareholder stakeholders can sufficiently protect themselves through bargaining and contract.
Non-shareholder stakeholders—particularly employees—may not have the bargaining
power or ability to contractually protect themselves. Even labour organisations, which
provide a collective employee voice, are often of little assistance to employees in overcoming bargaining power disparity with respect to job security. Issues of job security
are often not up for negotiation in union negotiations because they are viewed as unduly
restricting management decision-making discretion.
Shareholders rightly require statutory protection: they make large financial investments, they do not exercise control over their capital contribution to the corporation and
they remain vulnerable to self-dealing by management. However, in comparison with
other stakeholder groups, shareholders rank low in terms of vulnerability and need for
protection.

Progressive corporate law theory: consideration of stakeholders
Proponents of stakeholder theory view the corporation as a complex set of intricate
relationships and acknowledge the interests of multiple parties as integral to the successful functioning of a company. Stakeholder theory envisions the corporation as a network
of integral components, including stakeholder groups such as employees, creditors and
suppliers along with shareholders. A stakeholder is broadly seen as anyone who affects
or is affected by a corporation (Springer 1999).
The stakeholder-centred approach acknowledges that board decisions have implications that are more far-reaching than share value. The theory demands that corporations
be managed in the interests of all stakeholders. With respect to consideration of
employee interests under this theory, Adams and Matheson (2000) note that employees
are as much members of a firm as shareholders who provide capital investment:
employees may have a much greater investment in the enterprise by their years of service,
may have less ability to withdraw and may have a greater stake in the future of the
enterprise than many of the stockholders (Adams and Matheson 2000: 1,085).

The importance of the employee as a corporate stakeholder will be further developed
later, in the reconsideration of the worker as an investor of human capital.

Human capital and investment theories: new considerations
Human capital is a combination of physical capability, intelligence and educational
investment (Asefa and Huang 1994). The term acknowledges that employees are more
than machines: they provide ingenuity, creativity and initiative. Employees are human
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capital owners and investors. The currency that they bring to work consists of their
abilities, behaviour, personal energy and time.
Conceiving of workers as investors rather than assets emphasises the link between
employees and firms—‘[the binding agent] between people and organisations derives
from the ability and willingness of each to provide benefits to the other’ (Davenport
1999: 8; see also Hart and Moutos 1995). Companies cannot live by numbers alone;
they are dependent on their robust cultures. Commenting on the success of their
corporations, many chief executive officers (CEOs) cite the importance of their workers
as key to the firm’s prosperity. The following comments by CEOs, quoted by Deal and
Kennedy (1999: 22), illustrate this:
t Starbucks CEO, Howard Schultz: ‘If people relate to the company they work for, if

they form an emotional tie to it and buy into its dreams, they will pour their hearts
into making it better.’
t Continental Airlines CEO, Gordon Bethune: ‘Whatever problems you run into in

running a business, they are all people problems . . . businesses are run by people.
So at the root of whatever problems you have in your business, you’ll find people . . .
a lot of managers and executives miss the forest for the trees by forgetting to look
at their people.’
t Southwest Airlines CEO, Herb Kelleher: ‘Culture is one of the most precious things

a company has, so you must work harder on it than anything else.’
A corporation will not prosper if it assumes that it will be successful without the
benefit of dedicated employees who believe in the company and want to make it succeed.
Management ought to see employees as ‘human capital owners willing, under the right
circumstances, to contribute to an organisation’s prosperity’ (Deal and Kennedy 1999:
22). With more mobile human capital markets, employees as investors will more readily
shift their investment to a firm that will, ultimately, give them a better return.
In this capacity, employees are no different from shareholders. Both parties want to
see the firm’s wealth mature, and both want to reap the benefits of their investment,
financial or otherwise. Employees should be thought of as venture capitalists who are
investing their own assets. Therefore, it is legitimate to accept Davenport’s (1999: 8)
position that employees can be viewed as ‘particularly active one-member board of directors with ultimate responsibility for [their] individual investment and return results’.

The legal status of employees under corporate law
Employee vulnerability
Without an investment of human capital by employees, as described in the previous
section, a corporation is unable to function effectively. Combined with shareholders’
capital investments, employees’ human capital investments form an interlocking basis
on which a corporate pyramid may be built. Without either, a corporation simply will
not succeed. Accepting the argument that workers and shareholders are the two most
critical investors or stakeholders in a corporation, we propose that they ought to share
an equal claim on the corporation.
As noted in the traditional shareholder-centred view in the previous section, one could
argue that the interests of both sets of parties are protected in different capacities:
through fiduciary and legal duties for shareholders, and via contract for workers. The
reality, however, is not that simple. Private (or collective) bargaining does not sufficiently
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protect the interests of employees and, as investors, they are far more vulnerable than
corporate shareholders. Employees are also more vulnerable than shareholders, who are
in a position to diversify their investments and are not solely dependent on one venture
for their sustained livelihood.
Should directors owe a duty only to shareholders or to shareholders and employees?
Diversified shareholders prefer that management maximise profits, even at the risk of
potential bankruptcy: little regard is paid to firm-specific and long-term goals that do
not provide for a capital return.2 However, much less diversified investors such as
employees prefer a different risk–return calculation; they would rather see more average
returns as opposed to high risk and the possibility of high returns (Asefa and Huang
1994). Acknowledging the obvious dichotomy in bargaining power, potential risk on
investment returns and the motives behind how different investors (shareholder
compared with employee) view the corporation, it is clear that employees have more to
lose than corporate shareholders.
But why should employees be granted priority over other stakeholder groups, such
as creditors, customers and suppliers? There are several significant differences that
justify the distinction. First, employees are tied to their employers and are dependent
on their jobs for their financial and social wellbeing, whereas customers and suppliers
often have a number of options available to them. Customers often have more choice
in purchasing a comparable product or service from a competitor and rarely will a
supplier bind itself into an exclusive contract that prohibits it from supplying other
businesses. Second, with respect to the issue of contracting for protection, large
suppliers and creditors generally have access to legal resources and the educational
experience to have contracts drafted that protect their interests. However, in the case of
employees there is often a divergence in the bargaining power between themselves and
the corporation, not fully overcome by collective union bargaining, as noted above.
In theory, we do not reject that non-employee stakeholders groups are affected by
corporate decision-making, but it appears that non-employee stakeholder groups have
options available to them that do not make them fundamentally dependent on a corporation to the degree that employees are. Also, it is our view that, from a practical and
political level, it will be easier to lobby and convince legislatures to introduce protection
for stakeholder groups one at a time. Accordingly, once employee interests are introduced into corporate law statutes, with time it will be possible to lobby to introduce
broader statutory stakeholder protection.
In Canada, corporate law does not account for, or provide, proper remedies for
employees to secure their interests.3 Although employees may attempt to raise a deriva2 Leblanc (1997: 100) proposes that: ‘institutional shareholders, executive compensation plans, share-

holder litigation, the market for corporate control and management produce corporate decisions
based on short-term profits and their effects on share prices’.
3 Globally, Canada is far behind many other countries that have acknowledged the protection of
employee interests. In the USA, corporate constituency statutes have been protecting employees, as
stakeholders, since 1983. In Germany and Japan, the role of the employee is acknowledged via
systems that create a link between industrial relations and corporate governance, primarily through
political cultures. David Charny (quoted in Blair and Roe 1999: 105) notes that: ‘The German model
. . . provides the basis for labour participation in managerial decision-making at three levels. Contracts regarding terms of compensation are negotiated industry-wide, with the social welfare state
providing an important component of background compensation . . . in the form of welfare entitlement.
At firms, workers’ councils (abetted by relatively powerful unions) deal with plant-level enforcement
of contract and legal rights and at least temper the exercise of managerial power in implementing
investment decisions and determining production methods. At the top, co-determination enables the
worker to have input at the high managerial level through representation on the supervisory board,
and, perhaps even more important, it provides access to information about managerial decisions.
The Japanese labour relations system, like the German system, enables workers to participate in
strategic decision-making both at the shop floor and at the pinnacles of corporate management, but
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tive action or oppression claim against the corporation in their capacity as a minority
shareholder or creditor, neither adequately accounts for the protection of employee
interests.

Employees as minority shareholders
Employees may be granted shares in a corporation as part of a remuneration package,
or they will purchase shares in their employer corporation, but this will rarely result in
a majority shareholder status. A conflict may then arise between the interests of the
financial shareholders (who constitute a majority and who may be seeking short-term
profit maximisation) and employee shareholders (who are generally concerned with the
long-term welfare of the corporation). Unfortunately, management will often act in the
interests of majority shareholders, for obvious reasons. Accordingly, employees, as
minority shareholders, may attempt to use the statutory derivative action to remedy
corporate decisions that are not in the best interests of the corporation (for the provisions
of the derivative action, see CBCA 1985).4
The statutory derivative action allows a minority shareholder to claim that a board’s
actions were not in the best interests of the corporation:. When a corporation is
aggrieved, a minority shareholder may, in turn, instigate an action to remedy the wrong.
In the case of directors’ actions that have a negative impact on employees, they may, if
they are also shareholders, argue that considering only profit maximisation is a harm
to the corporation because of potential negative long-term consequences. Any such
claim would, obviously, be driven by employees’ motives of ensuring the corporation
prospers, develops and thus maintains employee jobs. However, if one accepts the
human capital theory discussed in in the previous section, then ensuring that employees
keep their jobs is a factor in the long-term growth, development and success of a
corporation.
It is unclear why employees, without shareholding, are not deemed ‘proper persons’
for instituting a derivative action.5 Courts have acknowledged that (First Edmonton Place
Ltd. v. 315888 Alberta Ltd. [1988]):
in addition to protecting minority shareholders, the actions provided for by [the derivative
action and oppression remedy] serve the more general purpose of ensuring managerial
accountability. That purpose encompasses protection of the rights of not only minority
shareholders, but also creditors and even the public in general.

Therefore, although not a prevailing view in Canadian jurisprudence, employees
ought to have a right to claim, on behalf of the corporation, that a wrong was committed
to the firm if long-term employee interests were neglected in directors’ corporate decisions and/or actions.

it does so largely through informal, non-legal mechanisms. Japanese industrial production methods—
with their emphasis on flexible work teams, job rotations and problem solving and resource allocation
at the shop floor level—inherently require workers to make strategic decisions as part of the ongoing
production process. The Japanese model allows for promotion and ‘working up the ranks’ that
ensures that at least some board members will have personal connections and familiarity with the
firm, having invested their human capital over their careers with the corporation.’
4 Prior to the enactment of the statutory derivative action provisions, the harsh common law rule in
Foss v. Harbottle [1849], 67 E.R. 189 denied minority shareholders a remedy against abusive actions
by majority shareholders that were not in the best interests of the corporation. For an analysis of the
statutory derivative action, see First Edmonton Place Ltd v. 315888 Alberta Ltd [1988] A.J. No. 511.
5 Traditionally, the courts have restricted the derivative action to shareholders. However, some courts
have considered and upheld that the remedy could be extended to creditors as well; see Bank of
Montreal v. Dome Petroleum [1987], 54 Alta. L.R. (2d) 289.
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Alternatively, employees may elect to bring an action in their capacity as minority
shareholders under the statutorily provided oppression remedy (for the statutory provisions of the oppression remedy, see CBCA 1985). The broadness of the wording of this
remedy would, potentially, allow employees to commence an action in their own personal capacity (without shareholding) although no such claim has been grounded in any
Canadian judgement. Accordingly, an employee currently has to be cloaked as a minority
shareholder complainant, or perhaps even as a creditor complainant. In determining
whether relief should be granted, the courts have focused on: the reasonable expectations of the stakeholder; the unfairness or prejudice of the conduct in light of these
expectations; and the impact of the conduct on the stakeholder’s interests.
Without statutory guidance in determining ‘reasonable expectations’ and ‘unfairness’
courts have made use of their broad discretion in examining each case on its merits.
Among other conduct, courts have held as reasonable shareholders’ expectations that
the business will not fail and will not liquidate (see Westfair Foods Ltd v. Watt [1998]).
One may propose that this expectation, that the business will not fail, may be extended
to the employee context. After all, employees do not want to see the collapse of their
employer firm, because they are dependent on such employment to sustain financial
viability. In Westfair Foods Ltd v. Watt [1998], the Ontario Court of Appeal held that
directors have a duty of prudent management to forestall the failing and liquidation of
a business. Perhaps this line of reasoning could be used for employees to obtain future
relief under the oppression remedy.

Employee as creditor
Should employees be given ‘complainant’ status for statutory corporate law remedies
on the basis that they are creditors of the corporation? The court in Trillium Computer
Resources Inc. v. Taiwan Connection Inc. [1992] noted that ‘the use of the oppression
remedy by creditors is one aspect of the oppression remedy which is likely to see
increased activity and considerable development in the future’. Some judges have,
however, held that complainant status to creditors should not be granted freely (Royal
Trust Corp. of Canada v. Hordo [1993]):
the court’s discretion should not be used to give ‘complainant’ status to a creditor where
the creditor’s interest in the affairs of a corporation is too remote or where the complaints
of a creditor have nothing to do with the circumstances giving rise to the debt or if the
creditor is not proceeding in good faith. Status as a complainant should also be refused
where the creditor is not in a position analogous to that of the minority shareholder and
has no particular ‘legitimate interest’ in the manner in which the affairs of the company
are managed.

The reasoning of the court in Royal Trust Corp. of Canada v. Hordo poses more questions
than it provides answers: How is the position of a creditor to be likened to that of a
minority shareholder? How does one define interests in the corporation as ‘too remote?’
And what constitutes ‘legitimate interest’ in a company’s affairs?
One struggles with whether one applies progressive or traditional notions of corporate
governance and corporate law theory in answering such questions. Traditional Canadian
and US theory will eliminate many stakeholders from being granted complainant status
even though the broad nature of the legislation contemplates providing a remedy to
aggrieved parties that may otherwise have no grounds for relief. Progressive stakeholder
theorists would give a broader interpretation, and would extend complainant status to
creditors more readily, and to employees as well.
Ultimately, the employee–corporation relationship mirrors the creditor–corporation
relationship. Each invests, and each expects a return. Employees invest their human
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capital and expect more than short-term financial remuneration. They demand stability
and recognition for their commitment. The employee–employer relationship is a voluntary commitment, and, in assessing the reasonable expectations of the parties, one looks
not only to the written contract but also to the conduct and actions of the parties over
the course of the relationship (Westfair Foods Ltd v. Watt [1998]).
Unless terms of employment specifically stipulate temporary tenure, it is rational to
assume that any reasonable worker expects permanent employment (financial markets
permitting). Therefore, if the company dismisses staff, it is proper to expect the
employee to wish to seek remedy. This is not to say that any corporate downsizing is
grounds for remedy, but such a situation rather begs the question ‘who is going to look
after the interests of employees?’
If corporations will not take it on themselves to consider their employees’ interests,
and, although possible, courts do not appear to be prepared to extend existing corporate
law rights to employees, then it is time for statutory direction and guidance in the
consideration of employee welfare. The best solution for Canada (and as a model for
corporations around the world) would be the adoption of an employee stakeholder
statute—based on a modification of the constituency statutes currently in place in the
USA.

US constituency statutes
Stakeholder statutes have been prominent in the USA since 1983. Pennsylvania was the
first State to adopt such a statute, and by the year 2000 32 states adopted some form of
constituency statute. The effect of stakeholder statutes has been to allow boards and
individual directors to consider the effects that corporate decisions would have on
employees, suppliers, customers and other stakeholders when contemplating whether
any action is in the best interests of the corporation.
Stakeholder statutes in the USA take different forms. In some States they are optional
and may be included in the charter of the corporation if the business so chooses. In
other states, corporations may opt out of the state’s constituency statute (for further
discussion, see Springer 1999). Other variations include the breadth of factors directors
may consider, the context in which non-shareholder interests may be considered, the
corporate fiduciaries protected by the statute, the specific non-shareholders to be
considered or protected, and the level of protection accorded to a board’s decision.
US constituency statutes recognise that the corporation is a social entity that meets a
number of social needs beyond those of its financial shareholders. US stakeholder
statutes affirm a corporation’s obligations to non-shareholder parties that are affected
by corporate decision-making. Constituency statutes have not, however, been immune
to criticism. A central defect of stakeholder statutes is that ‘adopting a regime that
recognises shareholders as merely one of many constituencies or stakeholders . . .
eliminates much of the guidance for managerial decision-making. Under these reforms,
executives would be free to manage corporations based on caprice or bias’ (Schulze 1997:
1,612). Accordingly, we advance the position in this paper that Canada should adopt a
modified version of US constituency statutes focused exclusively on employees.

A model for an employee-centred stakeholder statute
Building on earlier sections of this paper, in this section we develop a model for an
employee-centred stakeholder statute. Such a statute would require directors to consider
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employee interests together with those of shareholders. The following addition to the
statutory duty of care provision in corporate law statutes is proposed:
1(a) Best interests of the corporation. In considering the best interests of the corporation, the board of directors, committees of the board, individual directors and
individual officers are required, in good faith, and without limitation, to deliberate on the short-term and long-term effects of corporate actions on:
– The corporation itself
– Shareholders as a collective entity and individually
– Employees as a collective entity and individually
1(b) In making such a determination, consideration must be made of the reasonable
effects of a proposed corporate action and the reasonable expectations of shareholders and employees.
1(c) No single interest, expectation or effect shall rank as a dominant or controlling
factor, but, rather, interests and expectations must be considered, without limitation, in tandem.
1(d) Consideration and attention to reasonable interests, expectations and effects will
not violate the duty of care of a director, or board of directors, to shareholders, or
a group of shareholders, or employees, or a group of employees, if the directors
make a reasonable determination, after a careful and prudent evaluation.
The proposed statutory provisions offer directors guidance in specifying the parties
to whom they owe a duty: that is, the corporation, shareholders (as an entity and individually) and employees (as an entity and individually). The employee–stakeholder
statute requires that the reasonable effects (of corporate actions), interests (of shareholders and employees) and expectations (of shareholders and employees) be taken into
consideration, with no one factor or group having dominance. ‘Reasonable’ does not
mean ‘plausible’. It is more restrictive and reduces the likelihood of a frivolous action
on the basis of a remote interest, expectation or effect that was not considered by a board.
Directors will be required to perform a ‘careful and prudent evaluation’, which will
alleviate concerns with directors acting hastily and neglecting due consideration of all
affected parties and interests. Such a standard is not unreasonable and could be
ascertained by a court without difficulty. The standard would mirror that of directors’
duties with respect to takeover bids. Courts would evaluate the actions of directors
subjectively by examining, among other factors, written records of deliberations, the
time spent discussing a corporate action and the thoroughness and reasonableness of
the effects, interests and expectations considered. Finally, the statutory provisions
attempt to alleviate concerns that directors will face increased liability by shareholders
or employees who are of the view that their interests have been disregarded. The statute
allows directors to act in good faith in the best interests of the corporation without fear
of repercussion.
The proposed legislation would extend obvious benefits to employees who have
historically been neglected in corporate decision-making. However, the proposed legislation would come at a cost. Employees would be far more restricted from bringing an
action for remedies under the derivative action or the oppression remedy. Shareholders’
ability to seek a remedy would also be restricted because the bar for oppressive conduct
would be raised. The derivative action, which currently receives less application, would
become nearly obsolete. Traditionally an action used by minority shareholders, it would
be difficult for any claimant to argue that the corporation was harmed, as corporate
interests are one of the factors directors must heed credence to under our proposal. The
oppression remedy could still be used if a shareholder or employee could prove that a
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board did not consider reasonable effects, interests or expectations in making a corporate decision and it resulted in oppression.6
The only hurdle that remains is the question of what becomes of other stakeholders
that have previously made use of the oppression remedy—primarily creditors. Hypothetically, the status of creditors and their interests would not differ from their current
ranking: creditor interests would generally remain far removed from the minds of
directors. Creditors could, potentially, argue that, under the new proposed legislation,
their interests should be considered under subsection 1(a) of the proposed provision:
the interests of ‘the corporation itself’ embody the interests of those with whom the
corporation has dealings in order to remain operative. Such interpretation would open
the floodgates to claims by any and all stakeholders. However, understanding the underlying intent of the employee–stakeholder statute should, hypothetically, lead judges to
a restricted interpretation. Perhaps it would be appropriate to include the intentions of
the legislation directly in the statute, as has been done in some US statutes. A proposed
footnote or preamble to the introduced text of the legislation could read:
2 Interpretation. In enacting subsection 1, the legislature intends to reaffirm certain
corporate governance rules and principles, and to acknowledge the key interests of
employees and shareholders in corporate decision-making. Subsection 1 should be
interpreted accordingly. In taking or declining to take any action, or in making or
declining to make any recommendation to the shareholders of the corporation with
respect to any matter, a board of directors will fully weigh the factors outlined in
subsection 1 and in the good faith exercise of their business judgement make a
reasonable investigation paying attention to the welfare of employees and shareholders concurrently.
As a result, the employee-stakeholder statute would offer legislative guidance to directors as well as to the judiciary and would overcome a number of vagueness issues in
defining ‘acting in the best interests of the corporation’.

Conclusions
Any case study of the rise and fall of Enron would highlight that financial benefits to
shareholders are sought at the expense of more vulnerable parties within the corporation. The traditional shareholder primacy model is unsympathetic to the realities facing
modern business firms. No one stakeholder group ought to have sole claim on the
corporation, because the corporation, properly conceived, is a network of integral stakeholder components. Accordingly, the best interests of the corporation should not be
equated with the best interests of shareholders, as traditional corporate governance
theory suggests. A number of stakeholder groups partake in the proper functioning of
any business organisation. Therefore, a stakeholder-centred approach properly evaluates the interests of all affected corporate parties. However, such a holistic approach is
flawed: directors are unable to manage a corporation effectively if they are accountable
to all corporate stakeholders. The reality of such a concern led us to evaluate the needs
of stakeholders and rank their priority.
In so doing, we focused on employees as human capital owners and investors. We
argued that employees may be equated to one-member boards that, with mobile human

6 This complements the specific language of s.241(2), grounds for oppression remedy, of the CBCA

(1985), which considers whether the powers of directors were exercised in a manner ‘that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of shareholders and employees’.

JCC 8 Winter 2002

59

jcc8.puri

7/11/02

12:04 pm

Page 60

poonam puri and tuvia borok

capital markets, elect to invest their skill, labour and expertise in a firm that will offer
the greatest return. We argued that, in this capacity, employees are no different from
corporate shareholders who provide financial investment. Without either financial or
human capital, a corporation would not be able to function.
Financial investment is not enough: Enron’s financial assets were not solely responsible for its success. Success was dependent on the skill and knowledge of employees
that could nourish Enron’s financial resources to create products and services that paved
the way to the corporation’s prosperity. Therefore, among corporate stakeholders, the
status of employees must be elevated to outrank any other constituent group, as
employees are the ground-workers without whom there would be no need for other
stakeholders.
In this paper, we have advanced the position that interests of employees ought to rank
equal with shareholders, on the basis of their vulnerability, their lack of bargaining
power in the employee–corporation relationship and their lack of diversification in their
investment in the corporation. Furthermore, we analysed existing case law that highlighted that statutory relief is not available to employees to the same degree that it is
provided to shareholders. We therefore concluded that the duties of directors should not
be limited to shareholders but rather should be extended to parties that are at greatest
risk of loss in corporate action—employees. We also made the case for our focus on
employees to the exclusion of other stakeholder groups.
The US has dealt with employee and stakeholder vulnerability generally through the
introduction of constituency statutes. We acknowledged that these statutes are not
without flaw and we therefore argue that Canadian corporate law statutes ought to adopt
a hybrid between the shareholder-centred approach currently in use in Canada and the
broad, open-ended constituency statutes relied on in the US. We proposed a model of
an employee-stakeholder statute, which, as the proposed text indicates, addresses the
needs of employees, shareholders and the corporation as a whole. It offers directors clear
guidelines with respect to corporate decision-making and with how to properly ascertain
what the phrase ‘acting in the best interests of the corporation’ means. The added duty
on directors is offset by the expected beneficial outcome that will see boards taking a
more holistic approach that will benefit shareholders, employees and the corporation as
a whole. The proposed addition will nourish business decisions and will stabilise and
strengthen the growth and development of successful, prosperous corporations. In turn,
the newly proposed provisions could act as a model for corporations operating around
the world in the global marketplace.
Employees have a special relationship with the corporation that entails both social
and economic consequences. Unfortunately, this reality has been neglected by current
Canadian statutory provisions which equate the ‘best interests of the corporation’ with
the ‘best interests of shareholders’. The unfortunate reality, as evidenced by the Enron
crisis, is that such corporate governance may result in grave consequences for far too
many innocent parties. The best means of ensuring directors’ appreciation of the full
consequences of their actions is through the expansion of directors’ duties to look
beyond corporate shareholders and to include the consideration of employee interests.
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